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## Finance - Economics

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The mania for price fixing is extending in a new and unexpected direction. It is now proposed to fix the price for money. A bill has been presented in Congress which would limit interest on deposits to the rates prevailing on January 1, 1918. It is stupid legislation. The government itself has recognized that money is worth more by increasing the rate on certificates of indebtedness to 4 1/2 per cent, and if other evidence were needed it would only be necessary to point out that borrowers of the highest standing recently have been compelled to pay more than 8 per cent for funds. Under the bill just introduced the money merchants would not be permitted to share the profits accruing from the high prices they demand and receive for money with the depositors, whose funds they loan. The proposal is so absurd that it is not likely to become a law, even if, as is not improbable, it has the backing of the Treasury or the Reserve Board. But, as far as interior bank balances on deposit with local institutions are concerned, it is possible that much the same thing may be accomplished by "unofficial" pressure. The Federal Reserve Board evidently wants the rate on such balances rigidly limited and within its own control in order to "restrict competition." Bankers say that the board is dissatisfied with the revised amendment to the constitution of the New York Clearing House Association, to be voted on today, providing a sliding scale of rates on out-of-town bank deposits. It is understood that the board wants a maximum rate of 2 per cent. This surely would have the effect of "restricting competition," but the cure would be worse than the disease. Certainly the New York banks would suffer severely were a maximum of 2 per cent established. It is estimated that local institutions would lose at least \$200,000,000 in deposits as a result. And a loss of that size might impair their ability to handle financing of such magnitude as they are constantly called upon to handle in the interests of the government. In all government financing New York has taken a leading part. It has purchased more than its share of Liberty bonds, and very much more than their share of the Treasury certificates of indebtedness has been taken by New York banks. Whenever the government has brought out an issue of certificates and banks in other cities have failed to purchase a fair proportion, it has only been necessary to notify the local institutions and they have quickly made up the deficit. It would be unwise to adopt artificial measures to interfere with the natural order of things in the money market at this time. New York is the natural money center of the country. Let it continue to function in that capacity.

Predictions of an early return to ease in the money market are not likely to be fulfilled. On the contrary, it seems probable that rates will tend to work higher. The market for time loans has practically dried up, and if the stock market were active it is probable that borrowers would have some difficulty in getting all the call money required at the "pegged" rate. Government withdrawals have been very heavy in the last few days. On Saturday many millions were taken from local institutions.

Here is the obituary of private railroad control, as written by A. A. Housman & Co., a Stock Exchange firm:

**DIED.**—On February 28, 1918, Private Railroad Control. Cause of death, regulation—a chronic illness which was brought to a climax of congestion and paralysis by the strain of war. Obsequies performed in the United States Senate, Washington, D. C., on this date. No flowers. All Public Service Commissions please notice.

It is a brief and touching story; but, like all things inevitable, it was so long in mind that when at last it happened the emotion was one of relief.

With the passage of the Administration's railroad bill in the House on February 28 a period was set to an era which, in our opinion, is closed for good.

The law contemplates returning the railroads to the owners within a stated time after the close of the war; but if the government continues to control, operate and finance the roads, even for a very short time, its interests and those of the owners will become so commingled that they can never be "unmingled," and the easiest thing will be the most expedient. The government will go on running and financing the railroads until in the due course of time actual ownership, perhaps, will arrive.

There is still another and stronger reason. Government control of the railroads will soon appear to have enormously increased the capacity of the existing railroad machine. Such results are beginning already to show. Facilities are being utilized,

not in the interest of the railroads, but in the interest of the public—not competitively, as before, and as is inevitable under conditions of private control, but in a cooperative manner. Tracks, cars, locomotives and terminals which formerly were employed to conduct unprofitable traffic are now turned to profitable use. Labor which was employed to move traffic as traffic, whether it were profitable or not, is being diverted to the most profitable uses. Duplicate facilities are pooled. The railroad machine for the first time since it was built is being operated as one great organism, where before it was operated as a number of separate and fighting units.

This conservation of energy and equipment will go further and further as the necessity for it increases; instead of spending money for new facilities, we shall first see what the full capacity of the existing facilities may be. That is yet an unknown quantity. Obviously, if we really do advance in results along these lines the country simply could not afford to have the transportation system restored to conditions of private competition, because that would diminish the capacity of the machine just as elimination of competition now increases it.

Offerings of call money were somewhat more liberal at the Stock Exchange yesterday, where the ruling rate was 5 1/2 per cent, compared with 6 at the close of last week. The banks are, however, continuing their conservative policy with regard to increasing their commitments either on call or on time. During the afternoon yesterday a small amount of money was placed at 6 per cent for the shorter periods on a mixture of railway and industrial securities as collateral. Otherwise this market continued quiet, without any change in fundamental conditions. The banks are forced to restrict their offerings owing to the demands of the government.

Ruling rates for money yesterday, compared with a year ago, were as follows:

Call money	Yesterday, per cent.	Year ago, per cent.
Sixty days	6 3/4	3 3/4
Ninety days	6 3/4	3 3/4
Four months	6 3/4	3 3/4
Five to six months	6 3/4	3 3/4

**Commercial Paper.**—Rates for prime commercial paper were firm at 6 per cent for practically all maturities. Out-of-town institutions were buyers on a small scale.

**Bank Acceptances.**—Brokers reported that only a small amount of bills were moving in this market yesterday. Rates were firm and unchanged from the close of last week.

**Discount Rates.**—Official rates of discount for each of the twelve Federal districts are as follows:

District	Over 15 or less to 30 days	Over 30 to 60 days	Over 60 to 90 days	Over 90 to 120 days	Over 120 to 180 days	Over 180 to 240 days	Over 240 to 360 days
Boston	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
New York	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
Philadelphia	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
Cleveland	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
Richmond	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
Atlanta	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
Chicago	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
St. Louis	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
Minneapolis	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
Kansas City	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
Dallas	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
San Francisco	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2

**Bank Clearings.**—The day's bank clearings at New York and other cities were:

City	Exchanges	Balances
New York	\$433,891,505	\$46,833,857
Boston	40,824,784	9,161,661
Chicago	97,946,459	7,006,008
Philadelphia	57,796,744	13,537,168
St. Louis	37,394,206	10,262,046

**Sub-Treasury.**—The banks gained \$117,000 from the Sub-Treasury yesterday.

**Silver.**—Bars in London were quoted

**Significant Relations**

Money and Prices:	Stock of money held in the country.	Year ago	Next period
Loans of all national banks	\$3,041,643,270	\$2,958,355,434	\$3,340,626,000
Bills discounted and bought by Federal Reserve Banks	\$840,732,000	\$114,236,000	\$1,406,228,000
Federal Reserve notes in circulation	1,406,228,000	\$336,061,000	1,793,243,000
Total gold reserve	1,793,243,000	\$897,926,000	
Average price of fifty stocks	74.86	75.86	89.88
Average price of twenty-five bonds	85.08	85.14	95.08
Food cost of living (Annalist index number)	286.430	287.028	233.914
General commodity price level (Dun's index number)	227.97	227.02	222.17
Production:			
Unfilled U. S. Steel orders, tons	9,288,545	9,477,853	11,576,697
Pig iron (daily average), tons	82,553	77,799	94,743
Wheat crop, bushels	1,011,328,000	1,011,328,000	1,011,328,000
Corn crop, bushels	3,159,494,000	2,566,927,000	2,566,927,000
Oats crop, bushels	1,587,286,000	1,251,837,000	1,251,837,000
Cotton crop, bales	10,949,000	11,449,930	
Distribution:			
Gross railroad earnings	13.7%	+6.9%	+11.1%
Bank clearings:			
General:			
Active cotton spindles	33,552,732	33,649,076	33,016,593
Commercial failures (Dun's)	1,185	1,185	1,185
Number	12,829,182	19,278,787	16,617,883
Building permits (Bradstreet's)	2,756,236	2,756,236	2,756,236

**Dollar in Foreign Exchange**

Exchange in Amsterdam rose higher again yesterday, following a sharp advance in London. Guider cables here were quoted at 46 1/2 cents at the close, up 1 1/2 from the high price of last week. Brokers reported only a light inquiry for Dutch exchange, explaining that the quotations here were made from the London lead. The strength of exchange on Amsterdam is due to the uncertainty over what Holland is going to do about the action of the United States and Great Britain in requisitioning the Dutch merchant vessels. So far as can be determined there has been no transfer of Dutch balances held in New York. Scandinavian rates were higher. Italian exchange rates were slightly lower, at 8.60 1/2 lire to the dollar for checks. Spanish pesetas were firm. The rest of the market showed no important change.

Closing rates yesterday, compared with a week ago, follow:

(Quoted dollars to the pound.)

Commodity	Yesterday	Week ago
Sterling, demand	\$4.73 1/4	\$4.75 1/4
Sterling, sixty days	4.72	4.72
Sterling, cables	4.76 1/2	4.76 1/2
Sterling, ninety days	4.70	4.70
(Quoted units to the dollar.)		
Francs, demand	5.72 1/4	5.72 1/4
Francs, cables	5.71 3/4	5.71 3/4
Lire, checks	8.60 1/2	8.58 1/2
Lire, cables	8.59	8.55
Swiss, cables	4.43	4.49
Swiss, cables	4.41	4.47
(Quoted cents to the unit.)		
Guider, checks	45 1/4	44 3/4
Guider, cables	46 1/4	45 1/4
Rubles, cables	13.25	13.25
Copek, kr., checks	32.25	31.25
Copek, kr., checks	30.37	29.85
Pesetas, checks	24.90	24.55

Below is given the current exchange value of foreign money in dollars and cents, together with the intrinsic gold parity, as calculated by the United States Mint:

Commodity	Current exchange	Intrinsic value
Pounds, sterling	\$4.75 1/4	\$4.86 1/4
Francs	0.17 1/4	0.19 3/4
Guider	0.45 1/4	0.40 1/2
Rubles	0.14 00	0.51 1/2
Lire, checks	0.11 22	0.19 3/4
Crowns (Denmark)	0.29 75	0.26 8
Crowns (Sweden)	0.31 75	0.26 8

The above rates express the cost of foreign money in terms of the American dollar. To buy an English pound sterling at, say, \$4.75 1/4, the intrinsic parity is \$4.86 1/4. Thus you save either in the purchase of the pound or in the sale of it, a discount of that amount. The fact that in England the demand for dollars with which to settle accounts in this country is greater than the supply is also a factor in the above rates.

**Melting of Gov't Silver Hoard May Be Delayed**

Authorities said to be satisfied with present market conditions.

Though reports from Washington are to the effect that an agreement has been reached between the Treasury and Congressional leaders on the legislation about to be introduced in Congress covering government dealings in silver during the war trade, local silver authorities yesterday said that considerable delay is probable before the government can go ahead with its plan of melting down more than \$200,000,000 of silver dollars now hoarded in the Treasury.

One dealer in silver said information obtained in responsible quarters indicated that the United States and British governments were apparently satisfied with the prevailing quotation for silver and that only a wild rise in the price would bring in government interference. Silver is currently quoted at 87 cents an ounce. Recent reports have had it that the United States had agreed to buy practically the entire output of the country during the next twelve months at \$2 an ounce.

According to advices from London, the reserve stock of silver rupees in India is running low and a further heavy demand for silver from that quarter is expected. In London there is also a short supply of silver, and a stock of five-shilling currency notes has been printed and is held ready for issue in case the supply of silver is found insufficient to meet future demands.

## Vanderlip Likely To Be Successor Of James Stillman

Directors May Combine the Offices of Chairman and President

As a result of the death of James Stillman, it is likely, in the opinion of several directors of the National City Bank, that the offices of chairman of the board of directors and president may be combined. If the change is made one of the titles may be dropped.

Since the latter part of 1916 the affairs of the bank have been administered through a board of five executive managers, and this system of government is believed to preclude the necessity of perpetuating both the offices of chairman and president.

Frank A. Vanderlip, president, will probably soon resign as head of the bank's savings campaign and return to active management of the National City Bank. It is understood that Vanderlip has been asked to withdraw from the bank and be succeeded by Mr. Stillman's son, Mr. J. P. Stillman, Jr., who is now on his way back from a vacation in Europe. Mr. Stillman, Jr. is expected in New York by the end of the week.

Although the directors will hold their regular weekly meeting today, it is believed that no reorganization measures will be taken up until Mr. Vanderlip returns. Resolutions on Mr. Stillman's death will be drawn up at the meeting.

The form of bank government which makes it possible to abolish one of the executive offices was established by Mr. Vanderlip. In 1916 he decided that management by a group had been made necessary by the rapid growth of the organization. At the end of every year, according to this arrangement, a general manager is chosen from the five members of the board. The position is at present held by James A. Stillman, son of the late James Stillman. In the absence of the president the general manager acts as the head of the bank.

The other executive managers are Charles V. Rich, Samuel McKelbert, William A. Simonson and John H. Fulton. Mr. Rich has been mentioned as a possible candidate for the presidency of the bank.

## May Compromise On Aetna Explosives Reorganization Plan

Strauss Says Common Stockholders Are Favored by Proposed Change

Developments yesterday in the controversy over the Aetna Explosives reorganization plan drawn up by J. & W. Seligman & Co., suggested that the annual meeting scheduled to take place today may be postponed in the hope that some compromise may be reached between the bondholders and the preferred stockholders on one side and the common stockholders on the other.

Frederick Strauss, of Seligman & Co., issued a reply to an advertisement in yesterday's newspapers signed by the "present management" which stated that the contemplated reorganization was not necessary as it "will not furnish a dollar of new capital." Proxies for the annual meeting were solicited in the name of F. E. Fenton, secretary of the company.

Mr. Strauss, in his statement, asserted that the present reorganization plan is more favorable to the interests of the common stockholders than the plan proposed by the "present management" by which the present management is bound not to pay any dividends on the common stock while any of the bonds are outstanding. As the reorganization plan provides for the payment of dividends on the common stock, Mr. Strauss said it is to the interests of the common stockholders to accept the plan, under which the bondholders continue to receive the same percentage of the future earnings of the company for the retirement of the bonds.

"As matters now stand," he added, "not only will the common stockholders receive no dividends, but they will be paid on the common stock until the bonds are retired, but the company is also in arrears of \$575,000 on its preferred stock dividends as of January 1, 1918. On the same date it also is in arrears to the extent of \$140,000 on the sinking fund for the preferred stock. All of these sums would presumably be payable as dividends on the common stock, before any dividend is paid on the common stock. The reorganization plan provides for the payment of dividends on the common stock, and the company is also in arrears of \$575,000 on its preferred stock dividends as of January 1, 1918. On the same date it also is in arrears to the extent of \$140,000 on the sinking fund for the preferred stock. All of these sums would presumably be payable as dividends on the common stock, before any dividend is paid on the common stock. 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